Abstract
We analyze a relational-contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling, the optimal relational contract may introduce distortions after a bad report. For some levels of the discount factor, output is reduced by more than would be sequentially optimal. This distortion is attenuated over time even if prospects remain bad. Our model thus provides an alternative explanation for indirect short-run costs of downsizing.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 33-58 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2019 |
Fields of science
- 303010 Health economics
- 502 Economics
- 502002 Labour economics
- 502009 Corporate finance
- 502021 Microeconomics
- 502042 Environmental economics
- 502047 Economic theory
- 504014 Gender studies
- 507016 Regional economy
- 405002 Agricultural economics
- 502001 Labour market policy
- 502003 Foreign trade
- 502010 Public finance
- 502012 Industrial management
- 502013 Industrial economics
- 502018 Macroeconomics
- 502020 Market research
- 502025 Econometrics
- 502027 Political economy
- 502039 Structural policy
- 502046 Economic policy
- 506004 European integration
JKU Focus areas
- Sustainable Development: Responsible Technologies and Management