Extending Cloud Build Systems to Eliminate Transitive Trust

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceedingspeer-review

Abstract

Trusting the output of a build process requires trusting the build process itself, and the build process of all inputs to that process, and so on. Cloud build systems, like Nix or Bazel, allow their users to precisely specify the build steps making up the intended software supply chain, build the desired outputs as specified, and on this basis delegate build steps to other builders or fill shared caches with their outputs. Delegating build steps or consuming artifacts from shared caches, however, requires trusting the executing builders, which makes cloud build systems better suited for centrally managed deployments than for use across distributed ecosystems. We propose two key extensions to make cloud build systems better suited for use in distributed ecosystems. Our approach attaches metadata to the existing cryptographically secured data structures and protocols, which already link build inputs and outputs for the purpose of caching. Firstly, we include builder provenance data, recording which builder executed the build, its software stack, and a remote attestation, making this information verifiable. Secondly, we include a record of the outcome of how the builder resolved each dependency. Together, these two measures eliminate transitive trust in software dependencies, by enabling users to perform verification of transitive dependencies independently, and against their own criteria, at time of use. Finally, we explain how our proposed extensions could theoretically be implemented in Nix in the future.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2024 Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses (SCORED '24)
Place of PublicationSalt Lake City, UT, USA
PublisherACM
Pages45-55
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9798400712401
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2024
EventACM Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses - Salt Lake City, United States
Duration: 18 Oct 2024 → …
https://scored.dev/

Workshop

WorkshopACM Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
Abbreviated titleSCORED '24
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySalt Lake City
Period18.10.2024 → …
Internet address

Fields of science

  • 102 Computer Sciences
  • 102016 IT security
  • 102038 Cloud computing
  • 102022 Software development
  • 102025 Distributed systems

JKU Focus areas

  • Digital Transformation
  • Sustainable Development: Responsible Technologies and Management

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