Abstract
This paper investigates whether decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions and incorporate variations of continuation values in their choices. Using data from professional and semi-professional basketball tournaments, we find that the expected relative strength of a team in future interactions indeed affects behavior in the present. The results also show that the response to changes in the continuation value is stronger if the structure of prizes is convex across stages, if the players are in a decisive game and if the prevalence of free riding within a team is low.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 544-565 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 179 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2020 |
Fields of science
- 303010 Health economics
- 502 Economics
- 502002 Labour economics
- 502009 Corporate finance
- 502021 Microeconomics
- 502042 Environmental economics
- 502047 Economic theory
- 504014 Gender studies
- 507016 Regional economy
- 405002 Agricultural economics
- 502001 Labour market policy
- 502003 Foreign trade
- 502010 Public finance
- 502012 Industrial management
- 502013 Industrial economics
- 502018 Macroeconomics
- 502020 Market research
- 502025 Econometrics
- 502027 Political economy
- 502039 Structural policy
- 502046 Economic policy
- 506004 European integration
JKU Focus areas
- Sustainable Development: Responsible Technologies and Management