A Pragmatist Philosophy of Science

Oh dear.
Introduction
When I first studied economic methodology in the mid‑ to late 1990s, the field
seemed to be characterized by a plethora of ‘-isms’ competing for dominance—
or getting things right: positivism (Hutchison 1938), operationalism (Samuelson
1963, 1964, 1965), logical empiricism (Machlup 1960), falsificationism (Blaug
1990/1985), realism (Mäki 1988), instrumentalism (Friedman 1953), and mod
ernism (McCloskey 1983).2 What on earth can motivate a methodologist to add
another item to the ‑ism soup poor students of methodology are told to spoon up?
Well, the simple answer is that the ideas defended by the classical pragmatists
f
it economics and its methodology particularly well. I will argue this in the three
contexts of the aims of economics, its ability to maintain a clear-cut positive/
normative distinction, and its ability to deliver true claims about the economy.
In each case, I will argue that pragmatist positions are better supported than their
competitors by economic practice and what we can reasonably demand of it.
Let’s begin with the aims of economics.