Formal Methods in (Austrian) Economics: the Case of Carl Menger

Activity: Talk or presentationContributed talkscience-to-science

Description

The Austrian School of economics is highly skeptical regarding the use of mathematics in economics and according to some accounts even rejects formal methods altogether. The restriction to arguments in natural languages purportedly originates with Carl Menger’s “essentialist critique of the use of mathematics in the social sciences” (Boettke 1996) and his avoidance of mathematics “out of principle” (Jaffe 1976). Unfortunately, there are only few brief passages available in which Menger explicitly discusses the use of formal methods in economics (Menger 1883, 1889). Based on a close reading of those passages, I call the received view into question and argue that Menger accepts the use of mathematics both as a means of presentation and as a means of demonstration. He merely denies mathematics the status of a means of research, i.e. formal methods do not grant a privileged access to essences underlying observable phenomena. Consequently, Menger’s position allows for partial formalizations of Austrian economic theory. In contrast (early) Wieser’s methodology, the strong essentialism of which Menger (1888) dismisses, Menger’s criticism of the use of formal methods in economics is neither principled nor strongly essentialist.
Period23 Jun 2023
Event title50th Annual Meeting of the History of Economics Society
Event typeConference
LocationCanadaShow on map

Fields of science

  • 603119 Social philosophy
  • 603120 Philosophy of language
  • 603102 Epistemology
  • 603113 Philosophy
  • 603124 Theory of science