Fact/Value Entanglement, Value Pluralism, and Economics

Description

Introducing and discussing three stances concerning fact/value entanglement and value judgements in economics: 1.Value Neutrality is the 'traditional' position, which is still held by many economists: that (ethical) value judgements have no place in positive economics. This view concerning the separability of facts and values is usually motivated by and combined with non-cognitivism about ethics. 2.Propitious Entanglement is the combined thesis that (a) facts and values are metaphysically entangled, and that economists cannot and ought not to investigate economic phenomena without ethical reflexion.; and (b) rational exchange makes disagreements concerning value judgements dissipate over time. Amartya Sen, Hilary Putnam and Vivian Walsh are prominent proponents of this view. 3.Pernicious Entanglement combines fact/value entanglement with the view that moral conflict is ubiquitous and permanent. Value Neutrality is made implausible by much recent work in philosophy of science. Propitious Entanglement is made implausible by a number of considerations concerning value pluralism. Pernicious Entanglement is the most defensible stance of the three, but it threatens the authority of science in society: because consensus concerning important scientific issues (say, on the impacts of a Unconditional Basic Income or on the effectiveness of Nudges) is unlikely to arise. I conclude with some reflexions on how to escape the resulting paradox.

Period	27 Jun 2022
Event title	12th Braga Meetings on Ethics and Political Philosophy
Event type	Conference
Location	PortugalShow on map