Another Entanglement Paradox

Description

I introduce and discuss three theses concerning fact/value entanglement in science: Value Neutrality, Propitious Entanglement, and Pernicious Entanglement. Value Neutrality, essentially the thesis that the aim of science is to discover an objective world, which can be achieved without making value judgements in the core areas of theory testing and acceptance, is made implausible by much recent work in philosophy of science. Propitious Entanglement, essentially the joint thesis that (1) value judgements to play important roles also in the core areas of science and that (2a) agreement on what are the ‘right’ value judgements is within our reach, is made implausible by value pluralism. Pernicious Entanglement, which joins (1) with (2b) that agreement on what are the ‘right’ value judgements not likely to be forthcoming, threatens the authority of science in society. A paradox between three normative principles Entanglement (‘Social values can legitimately affect scientific results’), Value Pluralism (‘There is a plurality of legitimate social values’), and Authority (‘Science should enjoy the authority it needs in order to play important roles in society (such as providing policy advice)’ results. Most philosophers of science in the past have resolved the paradox by rejecting either Entanglement or Value Pluralism. I conclude the paper by describing a resolution I term ‘Feyerabendian’, which rejects Authority, and which has received less attention in recent philosophy of science.

Period	21 Sept 2023
Event title	EPSA 23 - European Philosophy of Science Association
Event type	Conference
Location	SerbiaShow on map