Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand

Susanne Pech; Johann Brunner

doi:10.1007/s10713-006-0558-4

Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Begutachtung

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of time-limited pension insurance, we consider a model where for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided sequentially or simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types choose sequential contracts is an equilibrium and that this outcome is favourable for the long-living, but is unfavourable for the short-living individuals.

Originalsprache	Englisch
Seiten (von - bis)	111-146
Seitenumfang	36
Fachzeitschrift	The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
Volume	31
Ausgabenummer	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10713-006-0558-4
Publikationsstatus	Veröffentlicht - Dez. 2006

Wissenschaftszweige

405002 Agrarökonomie
502 Wirtschaftswissenschaften
502001 Arbeitsmarktpolitik
502002 Arbeitsmarkttheorie
502003 Außenhandel
502009 Finanzwirtschaft
502010 Finanzwissenschaft
502012 Industriebetriebslehre
502013 Industrieökonomik
502018 Makroökonomie
502020 Marktforschung
502021 Mikroökonomie
502025 Ökonometrie
502027 Politische Ökonomie
502039 Strukturpolitik
502042 Umweltökonomie
502046 Volkswirtschaftspolitik
502047 Volkswirtschaftstheorie
504014 Gender Studies
506004 Europäische Integration
507016 Regionalökonomie
303010 Gesundheitsökonomie

Zugriff auf Dokument

10.1007/s10713-006-0558-4

Andere Dateien und Links

Verknüpfung zur Publikation in Scopus

Dieses zitieren

@article{f5f0c4becf874b55bc54633243a976f2,

title = "Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand",

abstract = "This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of time-limited pension insurance, we consider a model where for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided sequentially or simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types choose sequential contracts is an equilibrium and that this outcome is favourable for the long-living, but is unfavourable for the short-living individuals.",

author = "Susanne Pech and Johann Brunner",

year = "2006",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1007/s10713-006-0558-4",

language = "English",

volume = "31",

pages = "111--146",

journal = "The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review",

issn = "1554-964X",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand

AU - Pech, Susanne

AU - Brunner, Johann

PY - 2006/12

Y1 - 2006/12

N2 - This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of time-limited pension insurance, we consider a model where for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided sequentially or simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types choose sequential contracts is an equilibrium and that this outcome is favourable for the long-living, but is unfavourable for the short-living individuals.

AB - This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of time-limited pension insurance, we consider a model where for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided sequentially or simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types choose sequential contracts is an equilibrium and that this outcome is favourable for the long-living, but is unfavourable for the short-living individuals.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/33845303204

U2 - 10.1007/s10713-006-0558-4

DO - 10.1007/s10713-006-0558-4

M3 - Article

SN - 1554-964X

VL - 31

SP - 111

EP - 146

JO - The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review

JF - The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review

IS - 2

ER -